General remarks:

This report has been drafted by those participants who acted as speakers in the meeting, summarizing the national reports that answered to the respective questionnaire elaborated by the working group "inde-pendence and effeciency of administrative justice" that has been in-stalled by the Association of European Administrative Judges.

 1.1. Describe the selection/appointment procedure that is applied in your country 
 1.2. What are the terms of this procedure? 
 1.3. Is there specific professional background such as previous work record in the administration or general legal training included? 
 1.4. What are the possible contents examined during this procedure? 
 1.5. Who meets the decisions in the course of the selection/appointment pro-cedure and who selects and appoints the aforementioned decision –makers?
 1.6. Does the law provide for judicial remedies against decisions concerning appointment/selection?
 1.7. Does there exist any difference in the way the selection/appointment of judges of the civil/penal courts takes place?
 1.8. Is it possible for “external candidates” to be appointed as judges at dif-ferent court levels and instances?
 1.9. Are those legal provisions concerning the ways of selection/appointment of judges constitutionally entrenched?

 2.1. Is the term of judicial appointment for life?
 2.2. Is it possible to extent the term of service of judges beyond retirement age? In this case who has the power to take the decision?
 2.3. Is it possible to appoint temporary judges?
 2.4. Is it possible for the judge to be removed or transferred and under what specific terms?
 2.5. Where does the power of removing or transferring judges from one office to another lie?
 2.6. Is it possible to transfer between the different divisions and types of courts?
 2.7. Is it possible to transfer to government administration and back?
 2.8. Does a transfer to the administration have a career-promoting effect?
 2.9. Is incompetence a ground for removal of a judge from the bench?

 3.1. Who decides about judges’ salaries?
 3.2. In what way and under what conditions are the salaries of judges in-creased? Are they accompanied by annual cost-of-living ad-justments?
 3.3. Is there a need for executive approval or executive decision to initiate the increase?
 3.4. Is it possible for the judges to initiate judicial proceedings against the State with regard to their remuneration and which are the competent courts in this case?
 3.5. Is there a uniform salary scheme for all courts, divisions and types?

 4.1. Describe briefly the ways in which the promotions of judges are made. What kind of procedures are to be applied in this context?
 4.2. Indicate the competent body for the promotions and the criteria ap-plied thereto.
 4.3. Are judges of the administrative courts promoted to the Supreme Ad-ministrative Court and under what conditions (seniority etc.)?
 4.4. Can judges accept any government assignment after retirement?

5. Standards of conduct (professional and service Code, public activities, law-related activities etc.)
 5.1. Can a judge be involved in law-related activities (arbitration, law prac-tice, writing books)?

 5.2. Can a judge be involved in business activities?
 5.3. Is the judge entitled to sideline employment?
 5.4. Is there a Code of conduct of judicial behaviour?
 5.5. Is there a Commission on Judicial Conduct or any other body to su-pervise the behaviour of a judge?
 5.6. Describe the restrictions - if there are any - on judges’ right to express their views?

 6.1. Who is in charge of the inspection of judges and in what way is this inspection conducted?
 6.2. Are there specific criteria for the evaluation of the performance of judges?
 6.3. Who holds the legal power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the judge? 
 6.4. Who decides the disciplinary tribunal and its composition? Is it per-manent or ad hoc?
 6.5. Is there a legal remedy against the decisions of the disciplinary body provided for by law?
 6.6. Is there a special procedure for investigating and prosecuting a judge?

 1.1. Indicate who is responsible for the central administration of administrative ju-risdiction
 1.2. Individual and collective independence of the judiciary
 1.3. Is it possible for sanctions (of any kind) to be imposed on a judge based upon the content of his/her decision?
 1.4. Can a judge face disciplinary charges solely on the basis of the substance of his/her ruling? Is this the case when a judge declines to follow a supreme court’s decision?
 1.5. Do you think that accountability of judges threatens judicial independence?
 1.6. Can a judge be held liable in civil actions for his/her judicial acts (e.g. be sued for damages for actions taken in his/her judicial capacity)?
 1.7. Are judges immune from prosecution in other courts for their judicial acts?
 1.8. Can criminal charges be brought against a judge for actions on his/her duties? 
 1.9. Do judges face sanctions for “decisional conducts”?

 2.1. Is the division of work among judges and the assignment of cases to each judge or panel done according to a predetermined rigid plan or is it flexible and may be changed easily?
 2.2. Who is in charge of case assignment?

 3.1. Is judicial administration effected through independent judicial self-governance?
 3.2. Describe briefly how the governing body/committee is elected?
 3.3. Is there any restriction for the members of the above body to participate in other syndicalistic bodies?

 4.1. Who is responsible for the administrative staff employed in the courts?
 4.2. Who is competent to make available the necessary funds for the performance of justice?
 4.3. Who has the power to execute and spend the budgetary allocations?

 1.1. Have there been cases of executive pressure on judges in any form?
 1.2. Can judges be members of the Government?
 1.3. Is it allowed for judges to participate in administrative bodies having decisive or consultative competences? 
 1.4. Do the administrative courts have the power to challenge adminis-trative acts of general character (presidential decrees etc.)?

 2.1. Can the legislature override a decision of a court if they disagree with the way the latter has applied or interpreted a law?
 2.2. Have there been retroactive legislative reversals of court decisions?
 2.3. Has there been legislation abolishing courts with results of statutory removal of judges and if so, how was it received?
 2.4. Pending cases?
 2.5. Can judges be members of the legislature?
 2.6. Do the administrative courts have the power to challenge laws?

 3.1. Are judges organised in associations for furthering their rights and interests?
 3.2. Are there separate professional representations for administrative judges, or a joint association of judges?
 3.3. What are the specific activities of the aforesaid association? De-scribe them in brief.
 3.4. Do judges have the right to strike or to hold a demonstration?

 1.1. Is criticism of judges, judicial decisions and judicial conduct in the press existent, frequent, rare? What are the relevant grounds for this? Could you give major examples?
 1.2. Are trials open to T.V.?
 1.3. Do you think that press reporting and commenting on judges, courts, judicial decisions and matters pending before the courts poses a challenge to judicial independence?

 2.1. Do you think that a judge’s engagement in politics or speaking his/her mind in favour of a political party compromises the public confidence in the judi-ciary?
 2.2. Are there institutions that favour strong public opinion in defence of the idependence of the judiciary?

 3.1. Is it allowed for judges to become member of political parties?
 3.2. Are there any major restrictions for judges with regard to their political ac-tivities? What are the consequences in case of breach?
 3.3. Are there any other restrictions for judges as far as their public activity is concerned?
 3.4. Have there been cases where political leaders attacked the judges and criticised their decisions?

 1.1 Describe briefly the kind of the initial training and the qualifications of an administrative judge prescribed by law and his further education and/or formation, inter alia in European law, emphasizing more par-ticularly the aspects which might help the judge to improve the effi-ciency of administrative justice.

 1.2 Do you think that a higher salary paid to the judge and, more specifi-cally, other (material) advantages which may be granted to him in consideration of the output might help to improve the efficiency of administrative justice?

 1.3 Please indicate the number of administrative judges in your country and compare it to the population being under their jurisdiction (an av-erage number can be indicated per country).

 1.4 Please indicate the number of legal or other assistants (including clerks, secretaries …) working for the administrative jurisdictions, in-dicating more particularly the average number per judge working at an administrative court.

 1.5 Describe briefly the working conditions of an administrative judge in your country, emphasizing more particularly the technical means which are at his/her disposal, as well as legal or other assistants help-ing him/her in his/her duties, his/her access to libraries and data bases, access to internet and so on…

 1.6 Describe briefly the internal working regulations of an administrative court and more particularly the way in which the work is distributed among the judges, the person in charge of the distribution of the work to be done by the respective judge and of the control of his/her work, indicating inter alia the criteria according to which the way of distribu-tion is decided as well as the criteria according to which the work of the administrative judge is controlled, as well as the possible sanc-tions which may be taken against the judge who does not fulfil the le-gal or internal requirements concerning the quality of his/her work. Describe in this context internal control procedures (if there are any).

 2.1 Describe briefly the access to administrative justice, indicating more particularly whether the complaint or file has to be introduced by a lawyer or any other professional and the conditions under which the plaintiffs may have access to legal assistance. Can you also indicate whether the procedures are accomplished only on a written basis or whether also oral hearings take place, indicating in which cases such oral hearings are organised and the persons who, at these occasions, are allowed to make oral submissions to the court.

 2.2 Describe briefly the different types of procedures which can be intro-duced at an administrative court, insisting inter alia on the differences existing between those procedures.

 2.3 Describe briefly the different steps of the procedures to be followed at an administrative court of your country, starting with the date the file is introduced until the date the judgment is pronounced, insisting more particularly on the deadlines which may have to be respected by the parties in order to introduce written notices, briefs, pleadings, state-ments as well as on the deadlines to be respected by the judge to pronounce the judgment.

 2.4 Describe briefly the internal organisation of an administrative court, and indicate whether the judges are working in chambers or if they are acting as individual judges, as well as the criteria according to which a case is dealt with either by a chamber or by an individual judge.

 2.5 Which kind of procedures do apply in case an urgent matter of any kind is introduced with an administrative court? Indicate also what kind of decisions may be taken by the judge dealing with this kind of urgent matters.What kind of interim measures or measures of suspensive effect may be granted by 
your Court upon the receipt of a complaint?

a) suspension of the administrative act complained against, 
aa) becomes effective when served to the parties, 
bb) may also have retroactive effect, 
b) my Court may order any interim measure deemed necessary when the interests 
of justice so require.
What are the legal criteria for a decision to give an order of suspensive ef-fect or 
order an interim measure?
a) Does the prospective outcome of the proceedings have any relevance? 
b) Please give a short description of the content of the legal provisions concerned.

 2.6 Indicate the types of control the administrative court may exercise over the activities of the administration or over the decisions taken by it: is it a control only of the legality of its decisions or can the judge also control whether the discretion was used by the authority in the spirit of the law? Is the judge allowed to take a decision instead of the administrative authority? Do there exist other types of control proce-dures?

 2.7 Indicate the delays of the procedures introduced with an administra-tive court, starting from the date of introduction of a complaint until the date the judgment is pronounced (average delays).
Is there any remedy against undue length of the proceedings for the parties of the proceeding before courts? Is this

a) a remedy provided by law (please give a quotation of the legal provi-sion) 
b) a remedy of informal character (please give a short indication of its content).
What may be the result of such a remedy?
a) actual acceleration of an individual proceeding
b) payment of just satisfaction 
c) reduction of a penalty imposed 
d) disciplinary measures against individual judges
Which authority is responsible to deal with such a remedy? 
a) the president of the Court
b) a supervising judicial body 
c) an administrative authority

 2.8 Which kind of means are at the disposal of the administrative judge (or the parties) in order to provide for a correct execution (enforce-ment) of the judgment. Does the judge have the possibility to give in-junctions to the administration? Do there exist specific procedures which the parties may use in case the administration does not volun-tarily execute the judgments?

 2.9 Which kind of new technologies are at the disposal of the administra-tive judge and do the procedures to be followed at the administrative court provide for the possibility to use standard forms or electronic transmittal techniques (for example, are the parties allowed to intro-duce the briefs by way of mail or other electronic transmittal systems) ?

 2.10 Do the administrative courts in your country possess central computer systems to which all judges are linked, and comprising inter alia data bases, general information, laws, procedural acts, access to electronic files and so on

 2.11 Indicate whether you think that the facilities used by the adminis-trative courts and the means put at the disposal of these courts by the State are appropriate and, if this is not the case, indicate the problems you have noted in this context and the possibilities to remedy.

 2.12 Indicate the total amount of money spent by the State to ensure the functioning of administrative justice, compared to the total amount of the State budget

 2.13 Do there exist alternatives to the contentious proceedings, for example mediation, arbitration procedure and so on in your country?

 2.14 Which kind of effective legal remedies can be used against a judgment of an administrative court of first instance?

 1.1 Do the administrative courts in your country have a person in charge of the relations with the press (press speaker)?
 1.2 Do the administrative courts in your country prepare annual reports about their activities? Is this report available to the public? To whom/ or to which body this report is it addressed?
 1.3 Does there exist a possibility to access by internet or by any other means the judgments pronounced by the administrative courts and other docu-ments which might be relevant for the public/parties?
 1.4 Do the parties of the case pending at an administrative court have the possibility to get information, by electronic or other means, about their file and the state of the proceedings
 1.5 Do the administrative courts of your country have the possibility to ex-change information or experience with other national or international courts or with courts situated in other countries and, if this is the case, could you give more information about this kind of exchanges?

 2.1 Do the administrative courts prepare statistics about affairs settled dur-ing the judicial year, about the stock of affairs pending and about the number of affairs dealt with by individual judges?

 2.2 Do the administrative courts possess electronic systems to ensure the follow-up of the affairs pending (e.g. electronic file system…)?

 2.3 In your country, are there mutual or internal evaluations (on periodical basis) of the quantity and quality of the work to be done by the court? Which is the body which is competent to prepare this kind of evalua-tions, are they done by the court itself or by any other bodies, authori-ties or courts? Do there exist control procedures of the judicial work done by the administrative judges and, if this is the case, by which kind of authorities (national or international) are these procedures accom-plished?

 2.4 Which kind of sanctions may be taken against individual judges in case of misbehaviour or in case the work to be done by judges has not been delivered in certain delays

 2.5 Do there exist compensation procedures in case of errors committed by the court or individual judges or in case of delays in the proceedings? If this is the case, could you briefly describe the kind of compensation procedures which may be used by the victims of such errors or delays.

 2.6 Do there exist possibilities for the public or the parties to introduce com-plaints against the way the administrative courts work

 2.7 Do there exist studies about the feed-back of “customers” (in a broad sense of meaning) of administrative justice, on the bases of inquiries made among the public, the parties or their lawyers, about the function-ing of the court?

 1. Could you indicate, according to your opinion, which are the factors (con-cerning organisation or rules of process) that cause malfunctions in the ad-ministrative judicial system in your country?

 2. Could you indicate which, in your opinion, might be possible remedies?

 3. Have you noted whether effective measures have been introduced in recent times to improve the system in your country?

In most of the countries administrative judges are appointed by the monarch, resp. head of the state f.e.: by the Grand Duke in Luxemburg,
by the President of the Republic: Poland, Estonia, except Supreme Court, France, Finland, Greece, Austria Administrative Court

In other countries nomination is enacted

by the Parliament: Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia (Supreme Court) 
by the Government: Sweden, Austria (independent tribunals)
by the Minister of Justice: Germany (some Länder)
by a Judicial Council: Croatia
by appointing commissions: Germany (some Länder, deputies and judges; federati-on: ministers and deputies)

The formal nomination is mostly enacted upon proposals; these proposals are co-ming from:

Judiciary Councils: Poland, Slovenia, Greece, France (far as it concerns the so called “external way” and civil servants temporarily assigned)
Judicial appointment board: Finland
Courts: Luxemburg (Administrative Court: for its members and the Presidents and Vi-ce-Presidents of the Administrative Tribunal), Estonia (Supreme Court; partly), Latvia (President of the supreme Court), 
Austria (Administrative Court; the Court proposes to the government and the go-vernment to the head of the state), Germany
Minister of Justice on basis of a suggestion of Justice Qualification Board, belonging to the government: Sweden (partly)

Required qualifications, training and tests:

 generally legal studies (no formal requirement in France)

 Schools (National School of Judges in Greece, ENA in France, far as the position as an “auditeur” in the Council of State or the way of “statutory recruitment” to admi-nistrative tribunals is concerned). To be admitted to these schools it is necessary to succeed in an exam. Exams also take place at the end of the instructions. Concer-ning ENA, the “top few” have access to the Council of State.

 Competitive exams: Italy (far as it concerns the Regional Administrative Tribunals and ¼ of the members of the Council of State) and Estonia

 â€œInterview”: Germany

 Profession as a lawyer: is not a formal requirement in Luxemburg and Poland, but it is such a requirement in Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia

 Practise in administration: France (“tour exterieur” to become maitre de requête or to become councillor; “tour exterieur” 
and temporarily assignment to administrative tribunals), Slovenia,
Austria (1/4 of the members of the Administrative Court)

 Court practise:
  as a judge (Austria 1/3 of the members of the AC must have the qualificati-on as a judge in the normal justice), Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia (for higher Courts)
  as a candidate or during a probation period: Sweden, Estonia, Germany
  as a legal assistant: Sweden, Finland

Can decisions in the context with appointments be challenged?

The appointment itself can be challenged in:
Italy 
France (competence of Council of State)
Slovenia
Luxemburg 
Croatia
Germany

Steps leading to appointment can be challenged in:

 Greece: decision whether a candidate is capable to be appointed as life time judge or prolongation of interim stage for more than one 
year
 Sweden: appeal of a candidate who is not proposed by the board to 
the government
 Poland: appeal of a candidate whose application shall not be heard
according to the decision of the President of the Supreme Court to 
the National Council of the Judiciary
 Estonia: decisions met by the judge examination committee can 
be contested before the Supreme Court en banc

The respective legal situation in Austria is not clear.

In Finland and Latvia it is not possible to challenge decisions concerning the nomina-tion of judges.

Identical systems for appointments in normal and administrative justice exist in: Lat-via, Germany, Slovenia, Sweden, Croatia, Greece, Finland

Similar regulations in: Estonia, Poland

Different systems in: Italy, France, Luxemburg and Austria

Nomination of external candidates is possible but rare in Latvia and Germany, it is ra-ther common in Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Sweden, Poland, Austria and Finland, whe-reas it is not possible in Luxemburg and Greece.

Detailed constitutional regulations concerning appointments exist in Greece and Austria. Some rulings are constitutionally provided in Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Lu-xemburg, Croatia and Estonia.

No rulings on constitutional level exist in Latvia, France and Sweden.

This presentation is based on the work that has been done by my colleagues in the following (13) fourteen countries: Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Austria, Fin-land, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Croatia. (And by my-self regarding Sweden)

My task is to try and summarise the answers in the qustionnaire that concern the personal independence of the administrative judge when it comes to the conditions of service and tenure and the financial security, part I. 2 and 3 in the question-naire. I wish to thank my colleagues for the ambitious work they have done by an-swering the questionnaire so thoroughly. My summary will not do full justice to the answers since I will not go into details in all areas.

As has been already mentioned, our meeting here today is based on the premise that all democratic states in Europe must exist under the rule of law. A fundamental prem-ise is that under the rule of law there must be a separation of powers so that the judi-ciary and the judicial system must be independent of the executive and the legislative powers of the state. Another premise of the rule of law is that no judge should be subject to the power of another judge in relation to either the procedure or the deter-mination of the merits of a particular case, except by means of an appellate process.

During the years there have been different definitions in the doctrine of the meaning of the independence of a judge. Some talk of substantive independence or functional or decisional independence. In this questionnaire we refer to personal independence. Regardless of the name the meaning of this is that the judge should be impartial and totally free from irrelevant pressures. This is not for the sake of the judge himself but for the citizens that seek justice…They must be granted impartiality in the process, and maybe this is even more important in the administrative process where the indi-vidual not always is entitled to – or in most cases does not have – a lawyer by his or her side but is alone against the state. Not only must the judge be free from irrelevant pressures in practice, he and she must also seem to be free from such pressures in the eyes of the public.

In order to secure the judges’s personal independence the judicial terms of office and tenure must be adequately secured. Executive controls over judicial terms of service, such as transfers, remuneration, retirement and judicial discipline must be regarded as inconsistent with judicial independence.

After this brief introduction I come to the answers in the questionnaires.

The security of judicial appointment is maintained by appointing judges for life. In no country “for life” is interpreted literally but until a fixed aged for retirement. (In Croatia though with the exception for those assuming judicial duty for the first time. After re-newal the duty is permanent). In most countries it is possible to prolong that time and thus work some years after retirement. The time for retirement varies from 60 years for women in Poland until 70 for the judges at the Polish Supreme Administrative Court. In France the retirement age is 65 but 66 for a parent of three children. See Answers.

In most countries it is not possible to appoint temporary judges but in Sweden and Finland it is. In Greece it is forbidden in the constitution. In Austria in the Independent Administrative Tribunals members are appointed only for 6 years. In France there is a special situation where civil servants are temporarily assigned to judges positions.

This question has been intepreted in a different manner by different countries. I read this question as not meaning removal on disciplinary grounds as the question of dis-ciplinary proceedings come later in this questionnaire but as a question concerning the possibility of removing a judge against his or her will in other cases. This is in all countries only possible in cases of reorganisation, such as changes in the structures of the courts, or if a court is abolished. In Luxemburg a transfer is never possible without the consent of the person concerned. Also in France forced removal and transfer is prohibited, even in case of promotion. This is recognised by law as a basic administrative judge’s guarantee.

I assume that transfer with the consent of the judge. This is possible in all countries except in Greece, where this is forbidden in the constitution. In Sweden this happens quite often – in Luxemburg it is possible in theory but it has never happened. In Aus-tria it is only possible within the Administrative Court and the I.A.T.

Here I will cite the answers directly: 
 Sweden: Yes and yes
 Finland: Yes and probably
 Greece: No, it’s forbidden
 Estonia: Yes and no
 Luxemburg: Yes, in theory, no, you lose length of years
 Croatia: Yes, but only to the Ministry of Justice – No, probably no promoting effect
 Poland: Yes, but you must be promoted “again” as a judge – Yes, indirectly, you have more experience
 Austria: No (?) and no
 Germany: Yes and no, not the transfer as such but the -experience gained may have such an effect.
 France: Yes – all administrative judges are obliged to serve at least 2 years in an-other branch of the civil service No, it has no promoting effect as it will entail a slow-down in career development
 Italy: Yes, to advisory tasks – No
 Romania: Yes – Yes or No, it depends on the individual case
 Slovenia: Yes and Probably not
 Latvia: Yes and Yes

Here again I think we have to separate the question from the disciplinary proceedings and only refer to incompetence that is not of a degree to be sanctioned within the disciplinary framework. It seems that in most countries “normal” incompetence of course leads to a slow-down in the career but not to removal. But the following coun-tries have answered yes to this question: Finland, Greece (when mental or physical incapacity), Estonia (only within three years after appointment), Croatia, Austria (in legally specified circumstances), Slovenia and Romania.

If personal independence inter alia means not being subject to pressure from the ex-ecutive and legislative powers of the state, then the financial security is crucial. A way of pressure is of course not rising salaries or even reducing them, or, as we shall see in the Swedish case, to link the rise in salary to the performances of the individ-ual judge.

In Sweden and Finland the salaries are negociated in collective bargaining between the Courts Administration and the Judges trade union with the exception of the high-est courts’ judges. In all the other countries the salaries are based on a statute or law and are increased in most cases according to cost of living evolution, index or other-wise more or less automatically. In Austria though, the law concerning the increase is a result of collective bargaining.

In Sweden and Finland the answer is no to both questions. But the judges can go on strike which has happened in Sweden (and in France). When the salaries are de-cided by law there is a need for an inititative from the executive or the legislative. Ac-cording to the Swedish National Courts Administration the chief judge or President at the court should decide the salary individually for every judge. The Swedish Judges trade union opposes this, fervently. The negotiations between the parties, which have been going on for years, broke down the day before yesterday after a litigation pro-cedure lead by an official conciliator or arbitrator.

Judicial proceedings: In the following countries a law court is competent to decide in disputes concerning judges’ remuneration, at least in theory: Greece, Estonia, Esto-nia, Luxemburg, Latvia, Croatia, Poland, Austria, France, Italy, Slovenia and Ger-many, that is in all countries except Sweden and Finland.

All countries have answered that there is a uniform scheme, which does’nt mean that the salaries are uniform or the same for all judges, since they vary according to hier-archy, seniority, the function upheld in court, etc.

The same is true until now in Sweden but if the salaries are going to be individual this will no longer be the case. On the contrary the salaries will vary according to the speed at work, skill (decided by the president at court?), ability to adapt to new ideas or whatever. We have an idea what it would be like since this model for remuneration was introduced at a small scale 5 years ago, concerning 88 judges or 10 percent of all Swedish judges. The reaction among the Swedish judges was violent and since then negotiations between the administration and the trade union have been going on. The judges refuse individual salaries for constitutional reasons. The Swedish Na-tional Courts Administration is determined to introduce an individual system in order to save money and facilitate recruitment of young judges. The question of independ-ence for the judiciary is, unfortunately, not present at all within the administration.

Many countries(f.e Croatia,Estonia,Finland,Sweden)apply the same procedures as for judges’appointment.
In some countries,no specific promotion procedures are organized for lower ranks judges. Thus,judges may apply for judicial offices in the court of higher instance like every other person(Poland).

An independant judicial body is involved into the promotion procedures in some countries(f.e France,Italy,Latvia,Sweden),but it’s sometimes not the case for promo-tions to the highest positions of first and second instance tribunals ,for which gov-ernments freely choose promoted judges(Sweden).
Such independent judicial councils usually consist partly of elected judges,but can be composed only by members of the supreme administrative court(f.e Greece).
Judicial bodies usually give only a binding (according relevant law or at least in prac-tise)opinion,final decision being taken by the highest State authority/or ministry of jus-tice/or national parliament(Estonia).
On the contrary,there is no independant judicial board in Austria,Estonia,Germany and Luxemburg.In that last case,opinion of the supreme court’s chief Justice plays a prominent part.

Promotions from lower ranks to higher ones may occur only by personal applications (Poland)or,on the contrary,occur automatically according seniority(many supreme courts as in Austria,France ,Italy)of after previous inclusion on a yearly promotion ta-ble(first and second instance courts in France,except for presidents of tribunals and sections’chairmen of administrative courts of appeal,who must apply for such posi-tions according seniority as well as quality of service).

Seniority seems generally the most important criteria for promotion from the lowest ranks to the middle ones and quality of service plays a major part for promotion to the highest positions.

In Romania,promotion from courts of first instance to courts of appeal and supreme courts need to apply for a specific examination.On the contrary,other countries pro-vide-when necessary- only for a specific training in that case.

Promotions to supreme courts are open to lower ranks judges in all countries,but not always by specific procedure.
All these promotions require officially or unofficially the previous agreement of the chief justice of the supreme court and also often the agreement of the plenary as-sembly of this court(f.e Austria,Estonia).
Promotions to supreme courts are strongly limited in France(One position of”Maître des requêtes”-middle rank position-from among sixteen vacant positions-one position of “Conseiller d’Etat-highest position-from among eighteen vacant positions).On the contrary, fifty per cent members of the italian Council of State are coming from the italian first instance administrative tribunals. The greek constitution provides that 1/10 of Council of State’s members come from administrative courts of first instance and appeal.

In Germany,contrary to other german administrative judges,judges of the supreme administrative court are elected by a joined commission made up by the 16 compe-tent justice ministers of the Länder and an identical number of members of the na-tional parliament.

No specific rules seem to prevent retired judges to accept such assignments.

All judges are entitled to run sideline part-time academic activities(Lectures,writing books or articles for legal magazines)usuallly after having informed their chief Justice or required his/her agreement.

Greek,polish and romanian laws expressly provide that didactic activities are the only ones that judges may practice.Violation of such rules are considered as a criminal offense in Greece.

On the contrary,judges are not allowed to deliver legal advice or advisory opin-ions,except for their family members(f.e Latvia),unless if they ask to become tempo-rarily free from duty in order to run such activities(France).

Arbitration may be practised in Croatia and Sweden,is forbidden in Estonia,as for most european countries,except exceptions strictly defined(f.e Italy).

Furthermore,french judges practise quasi-mandatory law related activities as chair-men of various administrative committees or specialized tribunals.

All judges are allowed to manage their own goods.Nevertheless,Greece has recently established restrictions as for the acquisition of stocks is concerned.
On the contrary,business activities are frequently prohib-ited(f.e,Croatia,Finland,France, Greece,Italy,Luxemburg,Romania),except for family enterprises.

Business activities are allowed in Austria,Germany and Sweden, unless they could jeopardize public confidence,and after specific authorization of the high Council of the judiciary(Sweden)or giving notice of such activities to their chief Jus-tice(Austria,Germany).
Estonian rules provide that a judge shall not be a founder,managing partner,member of the management board or supervisory board of a company.

On the contrary,there are no written codes of conduct in Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Italy, Luxemburg, Poland(Unless general provisions of the law stating that a judge should have a flawless character) and Sweden.

No specific body has been set up in order to supervise the judicial conduct.But,either high councils of the judiciary,when they deal with disciplinary procedures, or judicial disciplinary tribunals/boards/sections,when they exist,play indirectly this part.
Furthermore,it always devolves on the chief Justice and/or the chairman of the court to supervise the daily behaviour of a judge.

Even though the majority of european countries grant the same rights to judges like to other citizens,all countries seem to impose ,at least unoficially,some reservations to judges as regards expression of their political views,unless they are temporarily free from duty in order to stand for political elections.

Nevertheless,it is forbidden for an estonian judge to belong to a political party until next 1 january 2008 and it’s still forbidden to belong to a management or control or-gan of these parties in Croatia and,from next 1 january,in Estonia.

In addition,all judges may not speak about the processes that are pending before them and express their opinions in a way that could cause doubt about their imparti-ality.

Regular inspections as regards the quality of the work performed by each judge fre-quently devolves on the president of the court(France,Germany,Luxemburg,Poland).
Nevertheless,such inspections are carried out only by chairmen of the upper tribunals in Greece(Council of State and chairman of the administrative court of appeal)or in addition to the control exercised by the chairman of the court(Estonia).

A lot of criterias are used in order to assess this performance,these criterias being very similar as those used for civil servants.Such criterias are generally not set up by statute laws or regulations.
Guidelines are frequently established by ministers of justice, in order to ensure the compatibility of evaluations(f.e Germany).

The high Council of the judiciary is sometimes involved in such control either alone(Italy-Romania)or in addition to the supervision exercised by the court’s chair-man(Croatia).

In the first case,the high Council of the judiciary may carry out this inspection by its own inspectors(Romania)or delegate this supervsion to an another tribunal or a chamber of the supreme court(Italy).

Furthermore,many countries organized-in addition to the assessment of the individual judge’operformance carried out by the chairman of the court-inspections of a tribunal as a whole.Unless serious individual problems,these last inspections don’t deal with single judges issues(France-administrative tribunals and courts of appeal).

Many supreme courts don’t organize a formal inspection of judges(f.e Austria, France,Italy).

Lastly,it’s useful to notice the system organized in some first instance austrian tribu-nals,for which the inspection devolves on a commitee consisting of three members elected by all judges,in addition to the president and vice-president,who decide by majority.

Initiative of disciplinary proceedings often belongs to chairman of the court(Croatia,Estonia,France,Germany-only for minor offenses-,Latvia,Luxemburg,Sweden) and most frequently among other persons or bodies.

Ministers of justice are conjointly entitled to initiate proceedings in Croatia and Germany.

On the contrary,initiative of such proceedings devolves only to the chief Justice of the supreme court in Greece and Italy(or to someone under his/her authority(Poland)or conjointly with other persons as chairmen of administrative courts of ap-peal(Greece,for administrative tribunals and courts of appeal),parliamentary om-budsman in Sweden,and ministers of justice(Greece for all judges,Estonia).

Ministers of justice may sometimes take initiative only for judges who don’t belong to the supreme court(Latvia).
Lastly,only a collegial body can initiate proceedings in some countries(High Council of the judiciary in Romania,specialized bodies within the court itself(Germany,for most severe sanctions,elected internal committee for first instance austrian adminis-trative tribunals).

The disciplinary body is frequently the High Council of the judiciary it-self(Croatia,France,Italy)or a specialized committee within it(Romania).

On the contrary,it may be a specialized tribunal set up in the concerned court(Austrian first instance tribunals,Germany)or acting for all judges in the whole country(Sweden).

Plenary meeting of supreme court(austrian administrative court,Luxemburg)or a spe-cialized tribunal within the supreme court,whose composition is set up by lot(Poland)may be the only disciplinary tribunal.

The disciplinary body may furthermore be made up of judges coming from different degrees of jurisdiction (Estonia,Latvia)or from the two highest judicial levels(greek ad hoc body consisting of members of Council of State and administrative courts of ap-peal chosen by lot).

There is frequently no legal remedy against disciplinary decisions when they are taken by the supreme court(Austrian administrative court,Luxemburg)or by the disci-plinary section of the supreme court(Latvia).

Legal remedy is organized before the supreme court acting in its usual judicial com-position(France)or in a wider panel(nine judges in Romania)or consisting of all judges(Estonia).

Legal remedy is provided for before the plenary meeting of first instance administra-tive tribunals (Austria).
In Croatia,legal remedy is available only before the constitutional court.

Lastly,there is two degrees (right to appeal)of remedies in Greece.

In most countries,there is no specific procedure for investigating and prosecuting a judge against whom a criminal prosecution has been initiated.

In Finland,where disciplinary proceedings don’t exist,the code of criminal procedure don’t deal with criminal offenses of judges separately from the other ones charged against civil servants.The competent court is normally a higher court than this one in which the accused judge is on duty.

In Greece,there is a special jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions against judges (Pe-nal court of appeal).
According to polish constitution, a judge shall not ,without prior consent granted by a court specified by statute, be held criminally responsible nor deprived of liberty.A judge shall be neither detained nor arrested ,except for cases when he has been apprehended in the commission of an offense and in which his detention is neces-sary for securing the proper course of proceedings.The president of the competent local court shall be forthwith notified of any such detention and may order an imme-diate release of the person detened.

As regards disciplinary proceedings,there is usually a special procedure regulated by the judiciary act and/or disciplinary code(f.e Austria, France,Germany,Sweden,Italy,Latvia),but in most cases not substantially different from the general one used for all civil servants.